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SD-30433

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A. C. OF S., G-2, DA

TAB "A"

Probability of a Communist Attack on Japan During 1951

1. Recommend that the Intelligence Advisory Committee consider the desirability of preparing a National Intelligence Estimate entitled, "The Probability of a Communist Attack on Japan During 1951."

2. This problem was considered in SE-2, "Probable Effects on Soviet Intentions and Capabilities of Arming the Japanese National Police Reserve as Four Fully equipped Divisions," dated 21 February 1951. Inclosure B to SE-2 concluded: "There are no positive indications that the USSR intends to attack Japan by mid-April 1951, but it has the capability of doing so and could launch such an attack without any appreciable warning."

3. The problem was further considered, indirectly, in NIE-19, "Feasibility of Japanese Rearmament in Association with the U.S.," published 20 April 1951. Paragraph 7 of the conclusions to NIE-19 stated: "We do not believe that Japanese rearmament in itself would set off a general war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. If, however, the Kremlin were to conclude, in the light of the world power situation, that the rearmament of Japan and its alignment with the U.S. constituted a threat to the security of the Soviet bloc, the U.S.S.R. would probably resort to military action at the time and place most advantageous to itself."

4. Neither of these estimates bears directly upon the question of whether a Soviet attack upon Japan is probable at some time during the remainder of 1951. The first estimate, SE-2, restricted itself to the period ending 15 April 1951. The second, NIE-19, considered the problem in a restricted sense; i.e., the probability of an attack on Japan as a result of Japanese rearmament.

5. Indications of Soviet intentions in the Far East are discussed each week in the Watch Committee report. The most recent report available, No. 38, of 26 April 1951, stated: "There are no indications of an immediate military threat to Japan, but construction and improvement of air facilities known to be under way in southern Sakhalin reportedly includes a 'heavy bomber' base, alleged to have been completed in late March."

6. Available evidence recently received regarding the problem of Soviet intentions may be summarized as follows:

a. Recent evidence of increased stockpiling in the Far East has primarily involved flour.

b. There are reports indicating increased Soviet merchant ship traffic in the Far East between Vladivostok and Sakhalin, although this cannot be definitely related to military activity.

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c. Several reports allege that either Soviet ground forces or Soviet-organized, -trained, and -equipped, Japanese ground forces have moved to Sakhalin preparatory to invading Japan.

d. Air facilities are apparently under construction on Sakhalin, reportedly including the "heavy bomber" base mentioned in 5 above.

e. There is no evidence of increased traffic on the Trans-Siberian railroad.

f. Various unconfirmed reports continue to appear, alluding to a Soviet-sponsored force composed of former Japanese prisoners of war and/or of personnel of various assorted Asiatic nationalities, although there is no firm evidence to support this possibility. Some reports define this force as a "Japanese Liberation Army," while others say that it is part of an "International Volunteer Army" which is to aid Communist forces in the "liberation" of Korea and the remainder of Asia.

g. There have been a number of reports of low evaluation giving alleged dates for a Soviet and/or Soviet-sponsored invasion of Japan. (Many of the dates have since passed.)

h. Soviet efforts to collect information of military value within Japan have apparently been intensified recently.

7. The type of information involved may require that this estimate be a Special Intelligence Estimate rather than a National Intelligence Estimate.

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